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I have been asked to look at the ethical objections to using animals in research. I shall 
conclude that what is wrong is the causing of unconsented-to pain. 
 
The objections are the same as the objections to using human beings for the same 
purpose. If it is wrong to inflict cruelty upon a child, how can it be right to do so to a dog 
or even to a rat? I ask this question seriously. As rational beings, scientists should also 
ask themselves this question. I do not think they will be able to find a convincing answer. 
They may find answers based upon sentiment or self-interest but they will be hard 
pressed to find an answer that is just and rational. As scientists, we believe that we are 
all animals. Why, then, do we believe that we can do to other species what we would not 
dream of doing to our own? Where is the logic in this? Do we exploit white people 
because they are white? Should we exploit women because they are female? To exploit 
an individual because it is of another species is speciesism, which is a very similar sort of 
prejudice to sexism and racism. It is irrational. 
 
Consciousness 
 
Just a word about the fashionable and relevant topic of consciousness. Much has been 
written in recent years, but very little, if any, advances have been made in understanding 
consciousness. I see consciousness as an emergent phenomenon. It emerges from the 
activity of a living brain rather as electricity emerges from a coil of wire revolving in a 
magnetic field or as television messages emerge from glass, plastic and metal. In all these 
cases, that which emerges is quite different from the basic materials. We need to know 
more about emergence itself. This is where, I think, advances could be made. 
 
I believe that many nonhumans are conscious. We know with reasonable certainty that 
consciousness emerges from brains, and we know that many other species have similar 
brains to ours. Although I am never directly aware of anyone else’s consciousness, I tend 
to believe other humans who tell me that they are conscious. It is possible they are all 
lying robots, but then robots, too, may be conscious one day. There is no certainty that 
neurones rather than silicon chips are necessary for consciousness to happen. However, 
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let us assume that some others are conscious at least some of the time. I see no reason 
why this assumption should be restricted to our own species. Descartes’ reasons were 
only self-interest; he wanted to vivisect animals without guilt, and he wanted to believe in 
his own immortality. 
 
Pain 
 
Morally speaking, consciousness is supremely important, and of special relevance is 
that part of consciousness which is the experience of pain. By “pain,” I mean all forms of 
suffering—that is to say, I include fear, grief, anxiety, distress, the effects of captivity and 
boredom. I refer to all negative experiences. Sometimes—as in toothache—pain can 
seem like a pure experience. At other times, it is like an aura—a negative tone which 
permeates other experiences—a grey tinge to our emotions, perceptions or thoughts. 
Indeed, I believe that all our experiences are tinged either with pain or with pleasure. 
 
It is our capacity to experience pain—our painience—which is important morally.  
 
There are some strange definitions of pain in circulation. In 1980, the International 
Association for the Study of Pain defined pain as “an unpleasant sensory and emotional 
experience associated with actual or potential damage or described in terms of such 
damage,” and in 1987, Zimmermann, as amended by Kitchell, et. al., defined pain as “an 
aversive, sensory and emotional experience which elicits protective motor actions, results 
in learned avoidance and may modify species-specific traits of behaviour.” Well, these 
definitions raise as many questions as they answer. However, they at least agree that pain 
is an experience. But they also say that it is “a sensory and emotional” experience. I tend 
to look at it differently. Surely, some sensations are painful, and some are pleasant. 
Likewise, some emotions are painful, and some are pleasant, too. Sensory pain is the 
thalamic and cortical registration of impulses originating in sensory nociceptors, but it is 
not itself an emotion. Grief and fear are emotions, and whatever causes them (sensory 
pain or any other cause), they are, in themselves, unpleasant or, as I would say, “painful.” 
In the case of sensory pain (from a burn, for example), the initial pain is not emotional.  
 
Neither A-delta nor C fibre pains are emotional in themselves. The emotion comes as a 
reaction to the pain. That emotion could be one of joy in the self-punitive individual who 
seeks to reduce guilt through the mortification of the flesh. More commonly, however, it 
will be an emotion such as fear which, because it is in itself painful, adds to the totality of 
the pain experienced after the burn. Pain, in other words, is not per se an emotion; it 
accompanies and is a deep component of some emotions, such as fear and grief. At some 
point in the brain, painful sensations, painful emotions and even painful thoughts most 
probably trigger the same mechanism. Where this common mechanism is located, I 
would not know. I would speculate, however, that at least part of the mechanism is not a 
million miles away from the frontal lobes, whose ablation characteristically produces an 
indifference to painful sensations and painful emotions. Other parts of this “common pain 
system” may be located in the so-called pain centres of the thalamus. The point I am 
making is that although, for example, the fear of rejection, the pain of a broken leg and an 
unpleasant thought are very different experiences in many ways, they all share 
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unpleasantness—or pain—in common. At some level, this similarity is probably reflected 
in the activation of the same system in the brain. The aversive quality of pains, which 
gives them their reinforcement value in learning, can be remarkably similar regardless as 
to whether the pain is sensory, emotional or cognitive. This is further evidence, surely, 
that all painful experiences, involving many different cerebral systems as they do, 
nevertheless share painfulness in common.  
 
Let us leave psychology and return to the ethics. My remarks will apply to all ethics and 
not just to our concern for laboratory animals. 
 
Why, one might ask, is pain to be considered evil? Well, what property is it that all bad 
things share? The answer is that they all cause pain (in its broad sense). Most examples of 
killing, lying, cheating and stealing are bad because they cause pain.  
 
Injustice, inequality, and lack of liberty are bad because they, too, cause pain. Neglecting 
and rejecting are bad for the same reason. Pain is the common feature of all bad things. A 
bad thing is that which causes pain.  
 
There are, of course, many mysteries about pain and consciousness generally. One is, 
why is my consciousness mine?1 Or, why am I me? I mean, why is my consciousness so 
tied to my brain? There have been millions of other brains much like mine. Why did I 
never become conscious before? What is it about my memories that has caused this me-
ness to emerge? How is this sense of “me” rooted in this way? One feels one’s 
consciousness ought to be able to float off and join other consciousnesses, but there is no 
convincing evidence that it does so. This strangely material limitation to consciousness 
nevertheless underlines the importance of the individual. Consciousness, and that part of 
consciousness with which we are especially concerned, the experience of pain, are strictly 
individual. What happens to a conscious individual is the universe for that individual. 
Many moral schemes overlook this. Utilitarianism is an example. 
 
Aggregation of Pains and Pleasures 
 
Utilitarian theory argues that the pains of one individual can be traded off against the 
aggregated benefits to others. This is the situation we have in the Animals (Scientific 
Procedures) Act of 1986. This means that Utilitarianism will justify torture if it leads to 
advantages to others that are considered to be “greater” in total than the pain inflicted. 
This must be wrong; around each individual is the boundary of its own consciousness, 
and so, surely, such aggregations make no sense. There exists a barrier between 
individuals through which consciousness cannot pass. However much I empathise or 
sympathise with your pain, I can never feel that same pain. 
 
So, if there are a thousand painients each suffering x amount of pain, the significant pain 
score is x and not 1000x. If there is one painient suffering 20 units of pain and one 
suffering 5 units of pain, the meaningful pain score is 20, not the sum total of 25. In other 
words, the morally significant measure of pain in a group of painients is the maximum felt 
by any one of them.2 So the moral imperative is to try to reduce the pain of the maximum 
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sufferer in each case. You can aggregate or add up pains and pleasures within the same 
individual but never between several individuals. 
 
Trade-Offs 
 
Please note that aggregation and “trade-off” are not the same. I am saying you cannot 
add up or aggregate the pains and pleasures of several individuals. This is not the same as 
saying that the pain of one individual cannot be justified by the benefit to another single 
individual. Imagine, for example, causing mild inconvenience to individual A in order to 
reduce the extreme agony of B. Is not this justified? Imagine you see a very heavy man 
unwittingly sitting upon a child, causing that child intense pain as bones and organs are 
damaged and broken. For the sake of argument we shall say that the fat man is brain 
damaged and so does not even realise what he is doing. Are you not justified in giving the 
man a gentle shove, causing him trivial inconvenience as he topples sideways? Common 
sense suggests that you are. Yet, here we are deliberately causing slight suffering to an 
innocent individual in order to save a child from agony. In other words, we are prepared 
to trade-off the little pain of the fat man against the reduction in the great pain of the 
child.  
 
Let’s just consider the other great moral school—Rights Theory—for a moment. 
Although it has drawbacks, the concept of “rights” has become such a popular concept 
that we ought to look at it. Shoving the fat man is okay in Utilitarianism, but how does 
Rights Theory regard it? The implications of Rights Theory, although only at its most 
extreme, suggest that it is always wrong to cause suffering (however trivial) to individual 
A regardless of the benefits (however great) to individual B. So, according to this point of 
view, we would not be allowed to shove the fat man even if, instead of a child, he was 
sitting upon a nuclear release button that would, if pressed for a determined period of 
time, cause the destruction of the world and utmost individual agony. Such an ethical 
theory is absurd. Surely the trade-off here would be so advantageous that we must accept 
it.  
 
Of course, I do not want to be accused of misrepresenting those who advocate the rights 
position for humans or nonhumans. Most do not take the extreme position I have just 
depicted. 
 
This trade-off problem is really central to all ethical theories. It is not just a problem for 
those of us with a particular interest in reducing the sufferings of animals in research. 
Some sort of flexibility in ethical theory has to be accepted. But we can make a rule, and 
I think it is a good one, that it is always wrong to cause pain to A merely in order to 
increase the pleasure of B. It is wrong, therefore, to rape. It is also wrong to torture for 
fun.  
 
However much pleasure is gained, these practices are wrong. However, when we 
consider causing pain to A in order to reduce the pain of B, then we are in a very grey 
and difficult area. All I will insist upon is that (i) the rules should not be speciesist and 
that (ii) there should be no aggregation i.e., no adding up of pains or advantages among 
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different individuals. In our imagined cost/benefit calculus, B can only ever be one 
individual, presumably the maximum sufferer. 
 
Animal experiments are sometimes intensely painful, sometimes not at all. Similarly, the 
benefits are sometimes great, but more often they are negligible. In a few cases, indeed, it 
can be argued, plausibly, that the results of such experiments bring further suffering and 
distress. 
 
Two Further Problems 
 
There are two additional problems, first with deliberately causing pain which 
otherwise would not have occurred and, secondly, with the disparity in certainty between 
causing pain now and justifying it in terms of benefits which may or may not occur 
sometime in the future. In a painful experiment, the pain is certain, but the benefits are 
always uncertain. 
 
Let us briefly look at these two problems. The first can be put in the form of the 
question—if it is wrong to cause pain, is it more wrong to do so deliberately rather than 
inadvertently? Most ethicists, from whichever school, would agree that it is. So this 
immediately puts the animal experimenter into an even weaker position. He or she has to 
justify actions which, prima facie, appear to be deliberately wrong. As we know, of 
course, this attempted justification usually takes the form of some version of the “trade-
off” argument. That is to say, the experimenter argues that causing pain to A is justified 
because of the benefit to B. This, incidentally, was the approach used by those defending 
Nazi scientists after the war. It was claimed that the pain they had caused prisoners used 
in research was justified by the benefits achieved in terms of the consequent treatments 
for illnesses and injuries that their experiments uncovered. These defences failed, and 
they were convicted. 
 
Secondly, there is the added problem—and as scientists, we are especially sensitive to the 
difficulties of prediction—that the alleged benefits, at the time the research is being 
carried out, still lie in the future. There is no answer to this. Whereas in the case of the 
hypothetical fat man, it is almost certain that a shove will dislodge him, it is far less 
certain that a particular animal experiment will have a beneficial result. We all know this. 
I believe this makes the case against painful research even stronger. 
 
I am not trying to say that I have settled the trade-off problem. It has plagued ethics for 
centuries and will continue to do so. Would it be justified to experiment painfully on one 
human being in order to produce, with absolute certainty, a cure for cancer? If so, how 
much pain in the experiment would be justified? Would severe agony lasting for weeks? 
If not, would a short twinge? Of course, humans may be able to understand better what is 
happening to them than can nonhumans. But sometimes this will reduce their total 
suffering and sometimes the opposite. 
 
Evidence for Painience 
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In practice, we condemn any involuntary research upon a human being but adopt a 
much more lax approach toward painient individuals of other species. This is what I 
mean by speciesism. Can it be justified? For example, is there evidence that nonhuman 
individuals are less sensitive to pain than are humans? The answer is in the negative. On 
the contrary, the scientific evidence gets stronger and stronger in suggesting that 
individuals of other vertebrate species are, more or less, just as painient as we are.  
 
Let us look briefly at the evidence. It takes four forms—behavioural, physiological, 
anatomical and biochemical. First, when exposed to a stimulus which would cause pain 
to you or me, other vertebrates tend to show withdrawal from that stimulus and a 
tendency to avoid such stimuli in future. They may also vocalise or scream much as we 
would. The behaviour can be very similar. 
 
Physiologically, the autonomic reactions, for example, to noxious stimuli are those 
typically associated with any stress—disturbances in heart rate, blood pressure, 
respiration, galvanic skin response (GSR), and raised levels of cortisol or other 
hormones. These are broadly similar among a wide range of species. 
 
Anatomically, there is evidence of complex nervous systems in all vertebrate classes (and 
some non-vertebrates, such as the cephalopods) and of connection between central and 
peripheral parts of such systems. There is, of course, good evidence that pain is mediated 
by nervous systems generally. 
 
Finally, there is the growing amount of biochemical evidence that all vertebrate classes 
release both opioid and specific transmitter substances when exposed to noxious stimuli. 
Furthermore, they also respond to analgesics and self-administer these if painful 
experience is unavoidable. 
 
We have known all this since the report to the RSPCA by Lord Medway3 some seventeen 
years ago, and it has been powerfully reinforced recently by others, such as Steven 
Kestin4 in 1994. In a word, there is less doubt now than there has ever been in the past 
that many other animals are painient. This is true, too, for painful emotions, such as fear. 
 
Double Standards 
 
A concern for the individual is often a basis for laws protecting humans but not for 
those protecting nonhuman animals. The latter are almost invariably based upon 
Utilitarian principles where the suffering of an individual can be justified in the name of a 
greater benefit. Hence the typical offence is to cause “unnecessary” suffering. In most 
laws protecting humans, however, each individual is protected absolutely. For example, it 
is considered wrong to experiment upon a human being without consent, even if that 
experiment may bring some advantage to others. Of course, with human subjects, the 
likelihood of achieving useful results would certainly be higher. Why is there this 
speciesist double standard? Clearly, because of human self-interest. 
 
Rights and Duties 
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Roger Scruton has recently criticised my position.5 Furthermore, he attacks the idea 
that animals have rights on the grounds that only those who can observe duties deserve 
rights. This is clearly a wrong argument. He is confusing moral agency with moral 
community. What about babies? What about certain adults who are handicapped? They 
cannot observe duties. Are they, therefore, to be without rights? What about Roger 
Scruton himself if, when he falls off his horse while hunting, he hits his head and 
becomes temporarily incapable of observing duties? Is he thereupon stripped of his 
rights? Scrutonite theory seems to say—”I will only care for you if you are potentially 
able to care for me.” This strikes me as cynical, unsatisfactory and simply, unethical. 
 
As far as I am concerned, rights and duties are the opposite sides of the same coin. It 
seems to me that people who tend to feel confident and powerful prefer to use the term 
“duty,” while others, less secure, prefer the word “rights.” The former identify with the 
do-er, while the latter identify with the victim or the done-to. Both “duties” and “rights” 
are human inventions. “Rights” can sound peevish, while “duties” can sound patronising. 
There is an element of condescension about the “duties” attitude to animals. The 
Scrutonite seems to say—”I might help you or I might not, depending upon whether or 
not I own you.” Indeed, duties-people appear sometimes to be more concerned about the 
virtue of the do-er than the fate of the sufferer. Thus, Scruton also argues that it is the do-
er’s motive that matters. Carried to extremes, this type of argument might justify rape and 
murder provided they were carried out in a spirit of selfless sincerity!  
 
Personally speaking, I talk usually of speciesism and so avoid the argument over rights. 
But I do approve of the “protective fence” around painient individuals which the “rights” 
approach encourages. 
 
We are not, of course, talking of active or legal rights, like the right to vote. In the case of 
animals’ rights, people are talking about the passive right not to be caused pain. Since 
Darwin, we have all known we are animals. To go on putting our own species into a 
completely separate moral category is illogical and pre-Darwinian. There is no intelligent 
reason for it. It is sheer speciesism. 
 
I think there are basically three ethical positions among us animal welfarists—those of 
Peter Singer, Tom Regan and myself. I agree with Singer that pain is the crucial issue but 
disagree with his Utilitarian aggregation of the pains and pleasures of several individuals. 
I disagree with Regan’s view that it is the “inherent value” of an animal that matters. This 
is a bit too vague for me. I prefer pain (broadly defined) as the basic criterion of what is 
wrong. But I agree with Regan’s emphasis on the importance of the painient individual. It 
is the suffering of each individual that matters. I call my position “painism.”6
 
Conclusions 
 
In conclusion, scientists must at least acknowledge that there is a serious moral issue 
here. Not to acknowledge this would, I think, be irrational. Basically, the question is 
this—what gives me the right to cause pain to others, regardless of their race or species? 
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The modern generation of scientists has, I am glad to say, begun to face up to this ethical 
problem. We are also faced with the psychological and social problem of what sort of 
persons we want to be. In my opinion, animal experimentation, and even dissection, can 
have grave psychological repercussions. These, in turn, could conceivably have wider 
social effects. 
 
As regards the animals themselves, there are two main ethical issues—being made to 
suffer and being killed. Both are very important, although I am inclined to regard the 
quality of life for each individual animal (whether human or nonhuman) as being of 
greater importance than its duration. We all have to die. The question is—how do we 
live, and how do we die? 
 
In practical terms, we should never forget the three R’s—replacement, refinement and 
reduction.7 That is to say, the replacement of painient systems with nonpainient ones, the 
refinement of techniques so as to avoid the infliction of pain and the reduction in the use 
of animals generally. Most experimenters, at the very least, must be trained before they 
qualify for a licence to work with animals; for example, training in euthanasia, analgesia, 
anaesthesia, general animal care and ethics. They need to understand pain and distress 
and post-operative care and environmental enrichment. They must also be up to date in 
their knowledge of humane alternative techniques, and some incentive must exist to help 
them switch to these techniques as they become available. This means better programmes 
for training and retraining.  
 
There is a need for proper ethical committees, and these need to be more than mere PR 
exercises. They need to address the “cost/ benefit” calculations that are now a feature of 
the British law in this field. How far, for example, can tests of cosmetics ever be 
justified? 
 
We are faced sometimes with the question—is it worse to cause more pain to a few 
animals or to cause less pain to a greater number? Well, I have, I hope, made it clear that 
I consider that it is the intensity and duration of pain of the individual that is most 
important. You cannot aggregate pain scores meaningfully across individuals. It is better, 
therefore, to inconvenience ten animals than to cause severe pain to one. 
 
So, reduction in pain is the objective, not the reduction in the total number of animals 
used. The trade-off dilemma—central to the 1986 Act (which I played a part in 
persuading the government to put on the statute book)—remains problematical. But we 
can at least remove the principle of aggregation from its workings. A further amendment, 
I would suggest, is that there should be an absolute limit to the intensity or duration of 
pain permitted under the Act, regardless of expected benefits. Pain which is severe should 
immediately be prohibited. So also should be milder pain which is prolonged. Again, the 
emphasis should be upon the control of PAIN and not on the numbers of animals used. 
 
The science of animal welfare is a new field and is rapidly developing our knowledge of 
how to care for animals, satisfy their needs and enrich their environment. In the USA last 
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year, I visited a famous primate laboratory where much has been improved in the way in 
which the animals are treated. The interesting and technical field of environmental 
enrichment, however, still needs far greater application. I noticed that as the monkeys left 
the breeding colony and became experimental subjects, their environment became 
progressively impoverished. There is no justification for this.  
 
So, to summarise: as scientists we acknowledge that the human species is but one of 
many species. We know that other animals often behave as we do when in pain and that 
their nervous systems and their biochemistry are similar to our own. We know that 
nonhumans are related to us through evolution and that, therefore, it is inconsistent to 
continue to put our own kind on a moral pedestal entirely separate from all the others. 
How can it be moral to cause pain or misery to monkeys, dogs or rats if it is immoral to 
do this to humans? There are no rational grounds for asserting this. If it is wrong to 
experiment painfully upon humans, it must, logically speaking, be wrong to do likewise 
to nonhumans.8 We cannot, with consistency, argue that nonhumans are so like us that 
they produce valid experimental results and then claim that they are morally entirely 
different.  
 
As scientists we should remember simply this: pain is pain regardless of species. Pain, 
not numbers of animals, is the central issue. 
 
We cannot escape the conclusion that to deliberately cause pain is a very serious matter 
morally. Indeed, it is just about the only serious moral matter. 
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